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Abstract 
 
There has been a revival of interest in economic techniques to measure the value of a firm 
through the use of economic value added as a technique for measuring such value to 
shareholders. This technique, based upon the concept of economic value equating to total 
value, is founded upon the assumptions of classical liberal economic theory. Such techniques 
have been subject to criticism both from the point of view of the level of adjustment to 
published accounts needed to make the technique work and from the point of view of the 
validity of such techniques in actually measuring value in a meaningful context. This paper 
critiques economic value added techniques as a means of calculating changes in shareholder 
value, contrasting such techniques with more traditional techniques of measuring value 
added. It uses the company Severn Trent plc as an actual example in order to evaluate and 
contrast the techniques in action. The paper demonstrates discrepancies between the 
calculated results from using economic value added analysis and those reported using 
conventional accounting measures. It considers the merits of the respective techniques in 
explaining shareholder and managerial behaviour and the problems with using such 
techniques in considering the wider stakeholder concept of value. It concludes that this 
economic value added technique has merits when compared with traditional accounting 
measures of performance but that it does not provide the universal panacea claimed by its 
proponents. 
 
 
Measuring value added for shareholders 
 
The nature of the discourse regarding the measurement and evaluation of corporate 
performance has broadened in recent years with the adoption of different perspectives 
(Crowther 1996) and this has been reflected in the changing nature of corporate reporting. 
Thus Beaver (1989) states that there has been a shift from an economic view of corporate 
performance measurement to an informational perspective with a recognition of the social 
implications of an organisation‟s activities. Similarly Eccles (1991) states that there has been 
a shift from treating financial figures as the foundation of corporate performance 
measurement to treating them as part of a broader range of measures, while McDonald and 
Puxty (1979) maintain that companies are no longer the instruments of shareholders alone but 
exist within society and so have responsibilities to that society. Others (eg Tinker 1985) argue 
for a changed basis for accounting to reflect these changes. 
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The discourse therefore seems to have moved away from the concerns of shareholders in the 
firm and away from the economic rationale for accounting towards a consideration of the 
wider stakeholder environment. At the same time however these concerns cannot be ignored 
and  part of the discourse has seen a return to economic values in assessing the performance 
of the firm. Thus Rappaport (1986) recognises some of the problems with accounting, such as 
the exclusion of risk and investment policies from the analysis but goes on to consider the 
concept of shareholder value and how this can be created and sustained. He develops a 
methodology of shareholder value, arguing (1992) that a shareholder value approach is the 
correct way of evaluating alternative company strategies, stating that the ultimate test of a 
corporate plan is whether it creates value for the shareholders, and that this is the sole method 
of evaluating performance. He identifies a conflict between the achievement of competitive 
advantage and creating shareholder value when he states: 
 
 “Increasingly, companies are becoming polarised into two camps: those  
 who consider shareholder value the key to managing the company and  
 those who put their faith in gaining competitive advantage.”       ( p 85) 
 
but argues that both are based upon long term productivity. 
 
The return to a consideration of the importance of economic value to the theory of the firm is 
based upon the assumption that maximising the value of a firm to its shareholders also 
maximises the value of that firm to society at large. Within the discourse therefore the 
concept of shareholder value is frequently mentioned and there is acceptance of the need to 
account for shareholder value within the practitioner community. Indeed the annual reports of 
companies regularly report the creating of value for shareholders and it is frequently cited as a 
corporate objective. What is less clear however from an examination of such annual reports is 
precisely what is meant by this creation of shareholder value, which often seems to be used in 
a nebulous manner to indicate some desirable but unidentifiable objective. 
 
The concept of shareholder value as an objective therefore appears to be widely accepted 
within the accounting community but its use as a quantified evaluation is less often found in 
practice. This, it is argued, is because the managers of a firm are preoccupied with other 
objectives such as growth in size, turnover, market share or accounting returns, which are 
more easily measured. The achievement of these objectives is also often correlated with 
managerial rewards but less so with increasing shareholder value (Williamson 1963). Indeed 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) use agency theory to demonstrate how following managerial 
interests can lead to higher rewards for those managers at the expense of a reduction in the 
value of the company. 
 
Problems arise from the use of accounting measures as a means of evaluating company 
performance, and Stewart (1991) and Brealy and Myers (1991) separately consider how the 
use of earnings per share can be of doubtful value in achieving this end, both because of the 
different calculations used for the same accounting measure and because of the adoption of 
different accounting measures, while Fisher and McGowan (1983) show that ROI, ROA and 
ROE suffer from the same problem. 
 
 
Value-Based Management 
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In the US, there has been a shift in recent years towards a more explicit shareholder value 
oriented approach to corporate performance measurement, described variously as “Value-
Based Management” or “Shareholder Value Management”.  An increasing number of US 
companies, including such household names as Coca-Cola and Quaker Oats (Fortune, 
September 20, 1993) are reported to have adopted this approach, and it is receiving increasing 
interest in the UK and Western Europe. 
 
In this paper, the term Value Based Management (VBM) is used to encompass the closely 
related concepts of value-based planning (VBP), shareholder value analysis (SVA), strategic 
value analysis and economic value added (EVA)
1
.  VBM approaches involve the application 
of the principles of discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis as used in the net present value 
(NPV) technique.  Although theoretically consistent with NPV, the scope of VBM is much 
wider.  Whereas the use of NPV has traditionally been associated primarily with capital 
investment decisions only, VBM involves the use of DCF principles within an integrated 
financial system, covering strategic decision-making, performance measurement and 
reporting and also as the basis for managerial incentive schemes. 
 
The VBM concept which seems to have received most interest is the EVA approach, which 
has been advocated (Stewart 1991) as a better measure to assess corporate performance and 
the creation of shareholder value than conventional accounting measures. Indeed Stewart 
(1994) states that: 
 
 “ Economic value added is an estimate, however simple or precise, of  
 a business‟s true economic profit.”         ( p73) 
 
Economic value added is claimed to have a number of important advantages over traditional 
accounting measures, the chief one being that economic performance is only determined after 
the making of a risk adjusted charge for the capital employed in the business. Critics however 
argue that while this may be theoretically sound, the need to make arbitrary adjustments to 
standard accounting numbers in order to put the technique into practice makes the technique 
of doubtful validity. The application of the technique and the adjustments needed were 
evaluated by Coates, Davies, Davis, Zafar and Zwirlein (1995) who suggest that simplified 
calculations produce satisfactorily reliable results. 
 
This paper uses a study of Severn Trent plc in order to evaluate the technique in practice and 
to consider some of the limitations of the technique in assessing the performance of this 
company. 
 
 
Value added in traditional evaluations 
 
Severn Trent plc is a regional water company in the UK providing water and sewerage 
services to a geographical area in the midlands. Severn Trent plc, as a limited company, came 
into existence in 1989 as part of the transfer by the Government of these services from the 
public to the private sector, in its privatisation program. This company therefore provides a 
particularly interesting case study of the use of shareholder value analysis techniqes in action 
                                                 
1
 EVA is a trademark name of Stern Stewart & Co. for economic value added. 
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as the results can be evaluated since its date of incorporation. Since that date it has reported a 
continuing increase in turnover, operating profit, earnings per share (after exceptional items) 
and dividends per share, as follows: 
 
 
                                                     1991                     1996 
 
          turnover (£m)                     627.0                   1157.5 
          operating profit (£m)          197.2                    420.8 
          earnings per share               64.5p                      89.6p 
          dividends per share            17.55p                   28.53p 
          share price (at year end)      346p                     594p 
 
 
 
During this period however this growth, both in turnover and in market valuation, has been 
achieved partly through an acquisition program, with consequent increased borrowings, but 
nevertheless there has been a reported increase in shareholder funds. The salient figures are as 
follows: 
 
 
                                                                 1991                    1996 
                                                               £million               £million 
 
     fixed assets                                          1821                     3386 
 
     shareholder funds                                 1592                    2992 
 
 
 
The reported results of the company indicate a company which is in a strong financial 
position and has increased in value over the years since its formation, and the directors 
remuneration has reflected this improvement in results: 
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Directors‟ Remuneration 
 
    all directors  executive directors 
 
                                                  total    excluding 
    remuneration  pension cont‟s 
    £‟000   £‟000 
 
1991    1024.4    
1992    1006.1 
1993    1165.2 
1994    1320.2   709.8 
1995    1351.8   869.0 
1996    1249.9   985.8 
 
 
 
Total remuneration is given in the annual report for all years in question and has increased by 
32% between 1991 and 1995. Figures for executive directors are only reported separately 
from 1994 and, once pension contributions are excluded, show an increase of 38% in the 2 
years to 1996, reflecting the achievement of objective based upon growth in profit before tax 
and in earnings per share. 
 
The company has shown a steady increase in net operating profit during this period, but this 
has been achieved partly through increased capitalisation and the taking on of increased long 
term debt. The net result of this is that the return on capital employed has remained 
reasonably steady. These figures can be summarised as follows: 
 
 
                               net operating          long term       capital           ROCE 
                                  profit                      debt            employed         
                                £million                 £million          £million           % 
 
     1991                     197.2                      82.9              1592.5          12.4 
     1992                     260.8                    481.4              1997.7          13.1 
     1993                     299.0                    609.2              2402.6          12.4 
     1994                     329.7                    805.8              2715.4          12.1 
     1995                     374.3                    849.4              2857.3          13.1 
     1996        420.8                    797.4              2992.4          14.1 
 
 
 
Calculations of traditional performance measures therefore indicate that since privatisation 
there has been an increase in earnings per share, dividends per share and the share price of 
Severn Trent plc. The figures also show a increase in return on capital employed when 
calculated conventionally. Conventionally these would be taken to suggest a strong 
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performance by the company and hence an increase in value to the shareholders. The 
calculation of the return on capital employed can however be criticised because it does not 
consider risk or the cost of capital to Severn Trent plc. These measures can be contrasted with 
EVA calculations considered later in this paper, which specifically incorporate the company‟s 
cost of capital. 
 
 
The Use of Traditional Accounting as a Measure of Shareholder Value 
 
Traditionally, performance measurement and reward systems have been based on accounting 
numbers such as EPS and ROCE. A number of authors have criticised such measures for 
promoting a short-term focus for managerial actions (eg Ezzamel and Hart, 1987; Rappaport, 
1986).  Rappaport also argues that accounting profit fails to measure changes in the economic 
value of the firm, citing the following reasons: 
 
 - alternative accounting methods can be employed 
 - risk is excluded 
 - investment requirements are excluded 
 - dividend policy is not considered 
 - the time value of money is ignored 
 
Despite these limitations, there is a widespread belief in the UK and the US that share prices 
are driven by the capitalisation of a company's earnings per share at an appropriate 
price/earnings ratio multiple (e.g. Stewart, 1991).  A number of writers have described an 
apparent 'fixation' with EPS, and Rappaport (1986), states, '...In both corporate reports and the 
financial press, there is an obsessive fixation on earnings per share (EPS) as the scorecard of 
corporate performance'. 
 
In the UK, a survey by 3i in 1990 found that '...81% (of UK finance directors) believed that 
EPS was the main basis for the valuation of share prices'.  The Accounting Standards Board 
have sought to reduce the emphasis placed on earnings per share, primarily through Financial 
Reporting Standard 3 (FRS 3), 'Reporting Financial Performance', which required a number 
of changes to the presentation of the profit and loss account as well as the calculation of 
earnings per share and the definition of extraordinary items.  FRS 3 states: 
 
 'It is not possible to distill the performance of a complex organisation 
  into a single measure.  Undue significance, therefore, should not be  
 placed on any one such measure which may purport to achieve this  
 aim'.      (para. 52) 
 
However, soon after FRS 3 was published the Institute for Investment Management and 
Research (IIMR) published guidance under which 'maintainable EPS' could be calculated.  
The IIMR argued that this 'maintainable EPS' statistic was the key indicator of corporate 
performance, providing further evidence of the EPS fixation.  More recently, a Sunday Times 
survey of the top 200 UK companies, carried out in conjunction with Braxton Associates, 
found that most companies are still using EPS as the key target for guiding their businesses 
(Sunday Times, August 11, 1996). 
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The popularity of share option schemes and profit-related bonus schemes for top 
management, combined with the EPS fixation means that EPS is a widely adopted 
performance measure in the UK.  However, Stewart (1991) and Rappaport (1986) emphasise 
that there is only a limited relationship between EPS and value creation by a company.  VBM 
approaches, on the other hand,  are claimed to offer a superior means of promoting wealth-
creating corporate behaviour. 
 
In the next part of the paper, the performance of Severn Trent plc is again analysed, this time 
using the Stern Stewart EVA and MVA approach. 
 
 
Calculating value added in context 
 
Mechanisms for calculating economic value added are described by Stewart (1991), who 
elaborates the standard adjustments needed to transform accounting information into an 
economic value added calculation. A definition of economic value added can be given simply 
as operating profits after tax less a charge for capital used to generate these profits. The 
residual from this calculation is the measure of economic value added and if positive 
demonstrates that the company has earned a greater return on its capital employed than the 
opportunity cost of the capital employed, and has hence added value to the company from the 
viewpoint of shareholders. Opportunity cost is defined in this context simply as the market 
cost of capital, appropriately weighted between equity and debt capital. If negative the 
opposite is the case and value has been lost. A full model description of the model used in 
this analysis is given as Appendix 1. 
 
Associated with economic value added is the measure market value added which is defined 
by Stewart (1991) as the market value of the company (ie stock price x shares outstanding) 
minus the economic book value of the capital employed. Stewart argues that this measure is 
superior to just using market value as a means of assessing the value creating performance of 
a company because market value can be increased simply by investing as much capital as 
possible, without consideration of the returns to be achieved from this investment. In theory, 
market value added should reflect the present value of expected future value added and 
thereby provides a measure of the expectation of shareholder value created. In practice this 
relationship is not as simple as this because of the factors affecting the operation of the 
market. It is therefore argued in this paper that both measures need to be considered in order 
to evaluate the value of the techniques of shareholder value analysis in assessing company 
performance. The two measure together are therefore taken as a representation of shareholder 
value, and applied to the company used as a case study in the paper. 
 
 
Economic value lost  
 
The preceding analysis of Severn Trent between 1991 and 1996 based on traditional 
accounting measures indicated a relatively strong financial performance in the period.   It 
would be expected therefore that an analysis of economic value added would reflect this, and 
would demonstrate an increase in value created for shareholders. An analysis using the 
economic and market value added models outlined above, however, shows that this is not the 
case and that value has actually been lost in the business over this period. Full details of the 
calculations and results are given as Appendix 2 but are summarised as follows: 
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                                     economic value             market value            market 
                                            added                          added               capitalisation 
                                           £million                       £million                £million 
 
              1991                        (48)                            (633)                    1,224 
              1992                      (105)                            (900)                    1,128 
              1993                      (142)                            (375)                    1,840 
              1994                      (104)                            (361)                    2,046 
              1995                        (33)                            (759)                    1,855 
  1996          (80)      (659)         2,178   
 
 
Cost of capital in the calculations has been arrived at by using the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model for cost of equity and the average London Clearing Bank Base Rate for cost of debt, 
weighted for market value of equity and book value of the debt. The implications of changing 
the cost of capital used in this analysis are considered later in the paper but it should be noted 
that this only affects the economic value added calculation. The market value added 
calculation is independant of any cost of capital assumptions, being determined solely by 
book value of debt and market valuation. 
 
These figures therefore indicate that the company has lost value in each of its years of 
operating using the economic value added calculation and has also lost value in terms of its 
expected future value, although the reported figures for market value added are cumulative. 
Thus via the MVA calculations it can be seen that the company had on a cumulative basis 
destroyed £900m of shareholder value by the 1992 year-end, but recovered some of this value 
in 1993 and 1994 before losing value again in subsequent years. From the EVA numbers it 
can be seen that in each year under review the company has failed to generate a return in 
excess of its cost of capital, and has therefore destroyed value. 
 
These figures can be compared with actual market capitalisation which shows considerable 
increase over the period, although not consistently. Market capitalisation is of course affected 
by other factors than the performance of the company, such as the level of business 
confidence and the economic climate generally. These results, however, conflict with the 
reported accounting measures of performance and an explanation needs to be sought. It would 
appear that either the concept of shareholder value encapsulated in these measures of 
economic and market value added is faulty, or that other factors are at work in the 
determination of accounting measures of performance which are not accurately reflected in 
the calculation.  
 
The calculation of economic value added is highly dependant upon the accuracy of the 
estimated cost of captal used in the analysis, and this is one problem with the use of this 
technique. Merely changing the cost of capital used in the calculation changes the results of 
the calculation and the estimate of economic value added. The figures used, compared with 
the calculated ROCE (Appendix 2) are as follows: 
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                                 cost of capital                  ROCE            difference 
                                           %                               %                    % 
 
     1991                            14.1                             11.3                 2.8 
     1992                            13.6                               8.5                 5.1 
     1993                            13.8                               8.4                 5.5 
     1994                            12.7                               9.2                 3.5 
     1995                            11.3                             10.2                 1.1 
     1996                            11.0                 8.7            2.9 
 
 
 
It is clear therefore that this calculation is significant to the analysis and that if these 
assumptions were not appropriate for Severn Trent plc then the calculation of economic value 
lost changes. Nevertheless it is equally clear that the discrepancy between cost of capital and 
ROCE is such that significantly different assumptions regarding the cost of capital for this 
company (except perhaps for 1995) would be needed in order to arrive at a positive 
calculation of economic value added. It is also apparent however that the increase in long 
term debt during this period indicates an extensive capital investment program, and the need 
for such a program to replace the infrastructure of the company was acknowledged at the time 
of its flotation. It can therefore be argued that this capital investment lowers the calculation of 
value added in the short term but will increase it in the longer term. This argument is 
supported by the changes in the market value added calculation throughout the period. 
 
An evaluation of the concept of shareholder value as an economic measure of the success of a 
firm, as represented by these economic value added techniques, is however necessary and can 
be undertaken through a consideration of the technical problems with the calculation before 
considering the environmental context in which the evaluation takes place. This technical 
evalution  is based upon Stewart‟s model and is undertaken both in tems of market value 
added and in terms of economic value added. 
 
 
A Technical Evaluation of Market Value Added and Economic Value Added 
 
a) Market Value Added 
 
The Market Value Added (MVA) concept recognises that the market value of equity by itself 
does not constitute a reliable measure of shareholder wealth creation. As Stewart (1991) 
explains: 
 
 “Any company can maximise its total value simply by spending as much  
 money as possible (both by retaining most of its earnings and raising new  
 capital)  ...  The effective use of investor capital can be measured only  
 according to net present values - that is, the increase in value minus the  
 amount of new capital drawn into or retained by the firm”.  ( p.190) 
 
Thus, MVA seeks to measure how much a company has added to, or subtracted from, its 
shareholders investment, and is calculated as follows: 
 
 10 
 Market Value Added = Market Value - Capital 
  
“Market value” refers to the total market value of the equity and debt of a company, though in 
the case of debt, book value is often used as a surrogate. “Capital” reflects the cash invested 
in the business, both by shareholders and debtholders. Accurately estimating the amount of 
cash invested in a company represents a difficult task in practice. Stern Stewart advocate 
using an approximation to this which they describe as “adjusted book value”, which is based 
on the balance sheet capital employed of a business subject to a number of adjustments. 
 
It should also be noted that MVA does not indicate whether the amount of value created by a 
company in excess of that invested represents a sufficient level of return. For example, since 
MVA is an absolute measure, it fails to reflect the impact of the size of a business on its 
potential ability to create value. Comparisons of MVA between businesses of different sizes 
are, therefore, in themselves, not particularly meaningful. 
 
One of the main drawbacks of the MVA measure is that the level of dividend return to 
shareholders is ignored. Dividend returns are of course a potentially significant source of 
wealth-creation for a shareholder, and for certain companies which adopt relatively high 
dividend payout policies, to ignore dividends would potentially distort their “true” wealth 
creation performance. It is useful, therefore, to compare MVA with the total returns accruing 
to shareholders in a period. Total Shareholder Returns (TSR), in its simplest form, is 
calculated as the increase in market capitalisation for a period plus the total dividend paid in 
the period, expressed as a percentage of the market capitalisation at the start of the period. 
The calculation must be adjusted for the effect of any share issues or share buy-backs which 
have occurred during the period. 
 
The annual TSR for Severn Trent plc between 1 January1991 and 31 December1995 are as 
follows: 
 
 
   TSR%  
    
 1991    7.0 
 1992   -2.2 
 1993  68.9 
 1994  14.2 
 1995                  -5.4 
 1996  21.1          
 
 
 
The compound annual average TSR for the period is 16.05%, which is in slightly below the 
company‟s cost of equity capital which has been approximately 17% for the period. In other 
words, comparably to the MVA measure, the TSR for Severn Trent for the period also 
suggests that the company has in fact lost value for shareholders. 
 
MVA and TSR are both dependant upon movements in the market value of shares, which 
leads to an important common limitation. The market price of a share is influenced by many 
factors, some of which might be regarded as “market-wide” factors that are not directly under 
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the control of a company‟s management. Neither MVA nor TSR, therefore, may report the 
“true” underlying value-generating performance of a business. Also, since the market price of 
a share largely reflects expectations of the future performance of a company, there is some 
difficulty using these measures as periodic measures of actual performance. An improvement 
in a company‟s share price may be as a result of improved expectations about a company‟s 
future prospects, and very little to do with managerial performance during the period.  
 
 
b) Economic Value Added 
 
Economic Value Added is a measure of the economic profit of a business and describes the 
surplus earned by a business in a period after deduction of all expenses, including the 
opportunity cost of capital employed. An evaluation of the EVA technique can be undertaken 
firstly as to its appropriateness as a measure of periodic performance, and secondly as to its 
appropriateness for valuation purposes. 
 
 
EVA as Measure of Periodic Performance 
 
For any year, EVA represents the amount of capital invested in a business multiplied by the 
“performance spread”, the difference between the return achieved on invested capital and the 
weighted average cost of capital. In other words, a “true” profit in an economic sense is only 
earned if a business generates a return in excess of that required by the investors, both in the 
debt and also the equity of the business. 
 
The calculation can be summarised as follows: 
 
 EVA = Invested capital x (Return on capital - WACC) 
 
Alternatively, EVA can also be calculated as operating profits after tax less a charge for the 
capital employed in the business. 
 
 EVA = Operating profits after tax less capital charge 
 
  = Operating profits after tax less (Invested capital x WACC) 
 
Both methods give the same EVA result. 
 
The second method used to calculate EVA reveals an apparent dependence upon traditional 
accounting measures of profit and capital employed. Potentially therefore EVA is susceptible 
to distortions caused by the historic cost accounting convention, as well as by the choice of 
accounting policies and methods which companies may employ. 
 
The second method for calculating EVA also reveals the very close resemblance, in principle, 
between EVA and the residual income measure which has been used as measure of divisional 
performance for many  years. It is important to recognise, therefore, that at a technical level, 
EVA suffers from many of the same drawbacks as residual income. 
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Solomons (1965) is generally recognised as establishing RI as a significant management 
accounting technique. There is, however, evidence that residual income was used before this 
time. At the “Stern Stewart EVA Roundtable” (Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
Summer, 1994) Zimmerman reported that he has traced the technique back to a 1955 
monograph by General Electric‟s management, whilst Bennett Stewart states that Alfred 
Sloan‟s book, „My Years at General Motors‟, describes how in the 1920‟s General Motors 
were using a system where they set aside a 15% return on net assets as a target for their 
business. 
 
A number of technical problems which affect residual income also affect EVA. The 
calculation is highly sensitive to the accuracy of the cost of capital calculation. This 
calculation is highly subjective and requires a number of significant assumptions to be mad. 
Also the accuracy of EVA is dependent upon the extent to which the measure of capital 
employed used in the calculation reflects the value of the investment in the business. Since 
the purpose of the balance sheet under conventional financial reporting practice is not to 
attempt to measure the “true” value of the business, it is not surprising that this is a 
significant issue. Some of the major problem areas in this respect are discussed below. 
 
The effect of the historic cost convention which systematically understates the balance sheet 
value of the business, has already been mentioned. This results in EVA being distorted in 
times of inflation. This is because whilst cash revenues and costs are measured in terms of 
current prices, fixed assets and depreciation are measured at historical cost. This means that, 
without some form of inflationary adjustment, the investment base will be understated and 
profits will be overstated. This combination causes EVA to be overstated in times of 
inflation.  
 
Another potential distortion is caused by the impact of depreciation itself. Depreciation has 
the effect of reducing the investment base over the life of  fixed assets. This means that the 
cost of capital charge will reduce each year, and EVA will increase. This could encourage 
managers to continue to employ older assets, with low net book values, and defer new 
investment. 
 
To overcome these and other potential deficencies of EVA as a periodic measure of 
performance, Stern Stewart have identified as many as 164 adjustments which may need to be 
made to reported accounting numbers which they argue may be required to ensure the 
accuracy of EVA. Though Stern Stewart point out that on the grounds of materiality, few 
firms if any would require all 164 adjustments, the need to make these adjustments does, 
nevertheless, result in a potentially significant measurement cost. Many of the adjustments are 
time-consuming to make and from an external perspective would be rather complex and 
arbitrary given the limited amount of information available. 
 
 
EVA as a Valuation Tool 
 
EVA can also be used as a valuation tool at either the corporate, business unit or indeed 
project level. Using EVA, corporate value can be determined by adding the amount of capital 
invested in the business to the present value of future years‟ EVA: 
 
Corporate value = Invested capital + Present value of future expected EVA 
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At the project appraisal level, the net present value of a project can be determined by 
discounting the project‟s future expected EVA: 
 
Net present value = Present value of future expected EVA 
 
For valuation purposes, the problems relating to the use of accounting numbers in calculating 
annual EVA do not apply. Conventional accounting balance sheet values, and EVA based on 
conventional accounting profit can be combined to determine the appropriate measure of 
corporate, and ultimately, shareholder value. This property of economic profit measures such 
as EVA was recognised by O‟Hanlon and Peasnell (1996), who state: 
 
 “...even if accounting book values and profits bear little resemblance to  economic 
reality, EP [economic profit] numbers can be used within a  
 valuation model that has just as strong a theoretical basis as the standard  
 dividend capitalisation model.”     (p.50) 
 
Using EVA as a valuation tool is therefore equivalent to the traditional NPV approach.  This 
of course does not mean that the familiar problems with NPV are overcome simply by using 
EVA. The subjectivity involved in projecting future EVA, for example, is surely as great as 
that for future cash flows, and there is still the difficulty in accurately measuring the 
company‟s cost of capital.   
 
It is also recognised that, although as Solomons (1965) states residual income (and therefore 
EVA) is the long-term counter-part of discounted net present value, the use of residual 
income as a short-term performance measure does not guarantee that decisions will be taken 
that are consistent with the long-term net present value objective. A manager may be inclined 
to accept a project which generates healthy residual income in its early years, even though the 
total NPV it will generate is inferior to alternative investment opportunities. On the other 
hand, positive NPV projects may not be undertaken if they involve short-term reductions in 
residual income. EVA is of course also subject to this same potential problem. 
 
 
Accomodating the external environment 
 
As well as the shareholders of a business there are a wide variety of other stakeholders of that 
business, both internal to the firm and external (Crowther 1995a). While it is true that these 
have no legal ownership of the business, in practical terms it can be argued that they have 
power and influence over the operating of the firm (McDonald & Puxty 1979) which equates 
to quasi-ownership. This stakeholder view of the firm is of particular significance to Severn 
Trent plc in terms of some of its external stakeholders, particularly its customers, society at 
large and the Government. Using the shareholder value analysis undertaken in this paper it 
can be seen that the company has sacrificed value in the present in order to satisfy the needs 
of these other stakeholders. This contrasts with traditonal reported measures of performance 
which suggest that all gains have been appropriated by the shareholders, and EVA analysis 
provides such a company with a means of demonstrating that all parties have lost in the 
present for the sake of future gains. Conversely if the shareholder value had been shown to 
have increased during this period the technique would have failed to demonstrate that this 
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increased value had not been at the expense of other stakeholders. No other evaluative tool 
based solely upon the concerns of the shareholders can achieve such an end. 
 
The ownership and management of a large firm are divorced, thereby effectively divorcing 
the two elements of reward for capital from each other - reward for risk belonging to 
shareholders and reward for expertise belonging to managers. Shareholder value analysis 
assumes that all value in the business belongs to the shareholders without recognising that the 
valuation of the firm would change significantly if the expertise departed from the business. 
Conversely the results of the firm suggest that managerial expertise has been rewarded 
without any commensurate increase in value to the owners of the business. The analysis also 
assumes that the firm is managed on behalf of the shareholders who desire maximum value in 
the firm; others have argued that the divorce of managerial expertise and reward from risk is 
deleterious to corporate performance (eg Monks & Minow 1991) and has resulted in the firm 
being run for the benefit of its managers rather than its owners.  It is possible, however, to 
argue that shareholders are interested only in short term performance and will sacrifice future 
value in the company for immediate rewards in the form of dividend payments. Evidence 
exists in the form of increasing dividends paid (17.55p per share in 1991 rising to 28.53p per 
share in 1996) while the economic value added calculation demonstrates value lost in the 
business consistently throughout the period of analysis. This argument may suggest therefore 
that, in this instance, managerial and shareholder interests are in alignment and that the short 
term focus of the business is a reflection of shareholder interests rather than an effect of the 
managerial reward scheme, as suggested by Coates, Davis and Stacey (1995), this being 
merely a mechanism to align these interests. 
 
One objective of the firm is often considered to be survival but, considering the divorce of 
ownership from management of the firm, it is probably more realistic to argue that this 
objective is survival for the dominant coalition (ie primarily management) (Crowther 1995b). 
This objective can lead to risk minimising behaviour and to sub-optimality in performance 
(Coates, Davis, Longden, Stacey and Emmanuel 1993), but more significantly will lead to 
behaviour within the firm which does not consider the addition of value for shareholders. 
Shareholder value analysis takes this behaviour into account insofar as it is overt and manifest 
(ie has already happened or been planned) but not for covert behaviour - this can lead to a 
faulty analysis of the future and consequent problems in valuation. In the case of Severn Trent 
plc this can be interpreted as the managers of the business meeting shareholder objectives in 
terms of dividends and EPS while at the same time meeting their own objectives of rewards 
for performance, without either party demonstrating any apparent concern for the future 
survival of the firm. It is possible, however, to argue that traditional accounting measures are 
used in such a way that this reported performance continues to improve, and hence reward 
managerial performance, while value continues to be lost in the business. 
 
Govinderajan & Gupta (1985) argue that long run criteria contribute to organisational 
effectiveness rather than short term criteria whereas Rappaport (1986, 1992) suggests that 
shareholder value analysis addresses both and maximises both. There is, nevertheless, a 
considerable body of evidence which suggests otherwise and that a concern with shareholder 
value added and returns to shareholders leads to a short term focus and lack of regard for the 
longer term (eg Coates et al 1995). Indeed some managerial actions taken to boost short term 
valuations (eg downsizing) can be argued to actually reduce long term value, particularly 
when the product and market development capability is externalised. Evidence of these 
techniques exist in Severn Trent plc which has seen a 20% reduction in number of employees 
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over the past 5 years, to 5900, with this reduction continuing into the future. While it is 
argued that this reduction can be accounted for in terms of efficiency gains in working 
practices there is a very real danger that value in the firm has been lost, in terms of expertise, 
and that future value has been sacrificed for present performance, as reported with traditional 
accounting measures. Neither conventional accounting measures nor shareholder value 
analysis are able to effectively quantify unknowns such as this and both rely upon classical 
liberal economics which states that the market provides a mediating mechanism. 
 
 
The use of value added techniques in context 
 
Criticisms of the techniques of economic and market value added are founded in the ability of 
models to accurately reflect, by means of calculation, the value of a business. Such value is 
assumed to belong to the legal owners of the business (ie the shareholders) whereas the reality 
is that there are a variety of stakeholders in any business who have some claim to ownership 
of that business, and some power to effect their claim. Indeed there is evidence that the power 
of these other stakeholders is increasing over time and that the balance of power between the 
various stakeholders in a business is shifting on a continuing basis. The acceptance of this 
argument inevitably means that it is recognised that any model based upon economic 
calculations cannot fully reflect the value in a business. The techniques evaluated in this 
paper thus suffer from the same drawback as any other models which have been proposed in 
the past. This does not mean however that the use of EVA is without merit as it can be seen 
that the analysis gives some insights into the behaviour and performance of an organisation 
which are lacking when traditional accounting measures of performance are used. 
Recognition of the limits of the technique as a means of evaluating performance is however 
necessary in order to satisfactorily interpret the results of any such analysis. Thus it is argued 
that there is a place for the technique in the discourse concerning performance measurement 
but that it needs to be set alongside other techniques, rather than supplanting them as its 
proponents claim. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
       Method of calculating economic value added: 
 
                                                                                                     £ 
   calculation of net operating profit after tax: 
     profit available to ordinary shareholders                                      x 
     add returns to providers of non-equity finance                             x 
     adjust for non-recurring items                                                      x 
     adjust for research and development                                            x 
     adjust for provisions                                                                    x 
     adjust for goodwill                                                                      x 
 
     Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT)                                   x 
 
 
   calculation of capital employed: 
     adjusted capital and reserves                                                        x 
     add debt                                                                                       x 
     add provisions                                                                              x 
 
     Capital Employed                                                                         x 
 
 
     Economic value added calculation: 
 
     EVA = ( r - c ) x opening capital employed 
 
      where: 
 
        r = net profit after tax / capital employed 
 
      and 
 
        c = cost of capital 
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Appendix 2 - calculation of Economic Value Added 
 
 
 
    year ending 31st March 
   1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
   £mill £mill £mill £mill £mill £mill £mill 
 
profit available to 
ord shareholders   327.7   238.0   260.2   247.6   249.9   218.4 
adjustments: 
non-recurring items      55.0       (8.6)       9.7       8.9 
+ R & D      6.0      7.4      8.3      8.2      6.4      4.3       2.5 
- amortisation of R & D   (7.3)     (6.9)      (5.9)     (4.3)       (2.6)     (1.4) 
+ P&L charge for 
provisions    63.1   116.8    75.7     71.9     89.2     82.2 
- cash cost of provisions  (99.9)   (85.3)   (70.6)     (95.6)  (108.7)     (47.7) 
+ net interest charges   47.8    51.8     48.3     28.9     (4.3)     (51.5) 
- tax credit   (15.8)   (17.1)   (15.9)     (9.5)       1.4     17.5 
 
NOPAT    321.6   359.5   300.0   247.2   222.7   231.6 
 
debt: 
short term debt     45.6     25.8     31.1     59.7     30.9     20.6       6.5 
long term debt   726.1    762.5   742.7   609.2   481.4     82.9     47.5 
provisions     75.0   111.8     75.0     70.0     89.5     79.8     45.3 
 
total debt   846.7   900.1   848.8   738.9   601.8   183.3     99.3 
 
capital and reserves 2511.1 2290.0 2139.4 1979.8 1830.0 1828.3 1675.2 
goodwill write off    246.2   244.1   242.9   212.3   179.6       5.2       2.0 
non-recurring items     65.0     65.0     10.0     10.0     10.0     18.6       8.9 
R&D  NBA      14.2     15.5     15.0     12.6       8.7       4.9       2.0 
 
adjusted capital and 
reserves   2836.4 2559.6 2407.3 2214.7 2028.3 1857.0 1688.1 
 
minority interest       0.3       0.2       0.2       0.4       0.1       0.1       0.0 
 
capital employed  3683.4 3514.9 3256.3 2954.0 2630.2 2040.4   1787.4 
 
r = 
NOPAT / cap employed    8.7%   10.2%   9.2%   8.4%   8.5%  11.3% 
 
cost of capital    11.0% 11.3%  12.7%  13.8%  13.6%  14.1% 
 
EVA    (79.7) (33.2) (104.4) (142.2)  (104.7)  (48.4) 
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Appendix 2 - calculation of Market Value Added 
 
 
 
    year ending 31st March 
   1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991  
   £mill £mill £mill £mill £mill £mill  
 
market value 
at year end  2178.2 1855.5 2046.3 1840.2 1128.7 1224.2 
 
book value of debt   846.7   900.1   848.8   738.9   601.8   183.3 
 
total market value  3024.9 2755.6 2895.1 2579.1 1730.5 1407.5 
 
capital employed  3683.4 3514.9 3256.3 2954.0 2630.2 2040.4  
(per EVA)   
 
MVA    (658.5) (759.3)   (361.2)   (374.9)  (899.7) (632.9) 
 
